I.I. Introduction
Wide-spread expectations prevailed at the beginning of the transition processes in Russia and other East European countries that market institutions would arise spontaneously just after elimination of the centralized control. These expectations were not realized. It is clear now that spontaneous forces push the economic systems towards a different direction: government power is substituted at least partially by mafia control and corruption and rent seeking hampers the creation of western type market relations ( Alexeev, Gaddy, Leitzel (1995 ) , Leitzel (1996) , Levin, Satarov (1997) ). The new situation is somewhat similar to a "bad" equilibrium, when agents do not want any changes or do not able to enforce them.
A number of papers addressed this issue. Most of the authors analyze the costs of rent seeking (RS) activity and stress that higher governance quality and stronger law enforcement are needed to diminish the costs , Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) , Bicchieri and Rovelli (1995) , Bac (1996) , Gelb, Hillman, and Urspring ( 1996 ) ) . The theoretical conclusion, that economic growth is dependent on institutional quality, is supported by empirical researches (McCallum, Blais There are also some recent evidences that economic performance influences institutional quality ( Heybey and Murrell (1999), Chong and Calderon (2000) , 4 Paldam (2000)) 1 . The quality is measured by indices that reflect corruption level, property right enforcement, rule of law, but do not contain information about the government skill to choose macroeconomic policy. However some researchers underline that imperfect economic policy creates a base for RS and corruption. In fact a few papers examine this issue on a theoretical level . Ericson developed a general equilibrium model with bribes and demonstrated that the bribe equilibrium could be a Pareto improvement if price distortions prevailed in an economy (Ericson (1983) ). In Loayza (1996) , it is shown that distorted tax policy may give incentives for tax evasion.
Another important result was got by Polischuk and Savvateev (1997) (see also Savvateev (1997) ). They have shown that "social stability" of a RS regime depends on the elasticity of marginal cost function.
An economy can get out of a rent seeking regime only if a significant part of population recognizes that RS is harmful. Therefore it is very important to know the conditions under which RS is or is not advantageous. This is the main issue of my article. I do not assume that government is perfect. Its non-optimal tax policy and presence of externalities creates possibilities for RS to be advantageous. But every rent seeker has also production opportunities. Therefore the gain from RS depends also on technological efficiency and, in a dynamic framework, on the rate of consumers' time preferences.
I use two models to study connections between tax policy, technological efficiency, and consumers' preferences from one side and social stability of RS 1 Paldam has found that the corruption scale depends negatively on rate of growth and GDP per capita if one consider these indicators separately. However, the dependence is robust with respect to GDP in multiple regression whereas the coefficient to growth even changes sign. In the framework of our model, this may be partially explained by the presence of common productivity factor which influence both rate of growth and GDP per capita (see below). . 5 regimes, from the other one. In both models RS is associated with reallocation of the state revenue, the case which is particularly important for transition economies.
The benchmark of the first model is the exogenous growth theory developed by Romer (1986) and Barro (1990) (see also Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992)). I build a proportional content mechanism in a Barro model of economic growth. This RS scheme is traditional for RS considerations (see Lu (1994) , Polischuk and Savvateev (1997) ). Endogenous growth models were used in Loayza (1996) to study the shadow economy and in Mohtadi and Roe (1998) where lobbing was considered. The last paper is closer to my approach but it uses quite different contest mechanism and does not admit distorted government policy.
The second model, that I use, is static. It gives possibilities to investigate RS activities of heterogeneous producers and to exogenize the proportion of the state revenue assigned to RS.
The first model is considered in the next two sections of the Part I. Part II is devoted to the second model. Each Part has its own numeration of the sections, statements and formulas.
I.2. A growth model with RS
It is considered a Romer-Barro -type model (Romer (1986) , Barro (1990 
subject to the budget constraint c + da/dt = ra + y ,
6 antd to the No-Ponzi-Game condition
where c is consumption, ρ > 0 is the constant rate of time preference, a is the quantity of real assets (a(0) is given), r is the real rate of return, and y is the maximal production profit. The consumer chooses c and a taking r and y as given quantity. For simplicity and following a tradition, we take labor force as a constant, and assume that the instantaneous utility function is given by
where θ is a positive constant, θ ≠ 1.
A representative producer distributes rented capital, K, between production and rent seeking (RS) opportunities to find maximal value y of his/her profit function
Here F(k,g) = A k
Cobb -Douglas production function that depends on production capital k = K -s, and on the quantity of public services, g. The constants A, α are positive, α < 1. Government uses a fixed tax rate, σ, to collect tax revenue that is supposed to be a source of public services g. However, a fixed share, γ, of the revenue collected, turns out to be a subject of the RS activity.
Producers choose the quantity s of capital to seek for direct subsidies ps, where p is defined by the proportional contest mechanism. If s i is RS capital of the producer i then she/he gets s i γσ Σ j F( k j ,g) /Σs j , 7 so that p = γσ Σ j F( k j ,g) /Σs j . The number of producers is supposed to be fixed and all of them are similar. Therefore they make the same decisions in an equilibrium, s
Thus the equilibrium conditions are as follows:
The model ignores depreciation of capital. This seems to be a usual simplification.
However, in our case it includes an implicit assumption that depreciation rates are equal for productive and RS capitals. The RS capital is spent to build lobbing organizations and long-run connections, to pay salaries and bribes. Probably, this kind of capital depreciates faster than productive capital. The difference in depreciation rates may be taken into account in our model but calculation would be more complicated in this case.
I.3. Comparative statics
In this section we study under which conditions consumers gain or lose due to RS activities of producers and how variations of the parameters influence the role of RS.
In view of (3), equations (2) and (4) entail the following balance equation
The first order optimality conditions for the problems (3) and (1), (2) involve:
8 where subscript denotes a partial derivative with respect to a corresponding parameter, k, and λ is a consumption growth rate.
Using (6), (5), (8) , it is simple to check that the following equality is valid for the Cobb-Duglas function F
Taking into account (7), (6), (10) and the equality
Similar to the benchmark Romer -Barro case, our model has no transitional dynamics. The economy develops with a constant growth rate λ (see Appendix 1).
This is a consequence of the facts that the equilibrium quantity, g, of the public good and the total equilibrium quantity, F(k,g), of the good produced are linear
In view of (8) and (12) the rate of return, r, is constant on the equilibrium trajectories,
One gets a straightforward conclusion from (9) and (14) One has from (9)
where q = r− λ. The integral exists iff q > 0 which equivalent to the relation 2 r (1 −θ) < ρ.
In view of (14 ) we get:
Besides, θq = ρ -(1 -θ)r.
It follows from (9) that θλ γ = r γ . Therefore λ γ = -r γ /(1−θ).
Let k 0 = 1. Using (11) and formulas above, it is simple to check that
where s 0 is defined by (10 ) for k = 1 .
Since q > 0 and (1-θ)
q γ > 0, the sign of the derivative Φ γ coincides with the sign of the following function
After substitution c 0γ , q γ , c 0 , and q, and after some manipulations, we get
where
2 This requirement follows also from the No-Ponzi-Game condition (2a). 10 and r is defined by (14) (see Proposition A2 in Appendix 2).
Obviously, ω >0 since, by assumption, q > 0.
Our model and the function Γ depend on six parameters γ, σ, A, ρ, α, and θ.
For different sets of parameters, the RS activity may influence positively or negatively on the wealth of population. It is natural and convenient to understand advantageousness and harmfulness of RS in a local sense in accordance to the following definition.
Definition 1.We say that RS is (locally) harmful at x =(γ, σ, A, ρ, α, θ) if Φ γ < 0, and RS is (locally) advantageous at x if Φ γ > 0.
One can expect that population would oppose RS if it were harmful and support RS if it were advantageous. If RS is advantageous at x where γ = 0 then consumers prefer to have a non-zero RS scale.
Definition 2. A variation of a parameter is RS-promoting (RS-opposing) if
it may transform an RS-harmful state into advantageous one (an RS-promoting state into RS-harmful one), but not vise versa.
It was mentioned above that the function Γ( x ) has the same sign as Φ γ .
Using formula (17) , (18) , and (14) , one can check that Γ(x) grows to infinity if σ approaches 1; Γ(x) decreases with respect to A and increases with respect to ρ.
Therefore Propositions 2 and 3 are valid 3 .
Proposition 2. For every set of parameters (γ, A, ρ, α, θ) one can find σ * such that RS is advantageous at all x = (γ, σ, A, ρ, α, θ), σ > σ * .
Thus consumers are not interested in decreasing of the RS scale if the tax rate is too high. The following two propositions can be proved by straightforward calculations if one takes into account that the inequalities λ > 0 and ω < 1 are equivalent.
Proposition 4.
RS is harmful at every state x such that λ > 0 and
Note that the last inequality is definitely valid if the tax rate σ is not succeeded its optimal value α since α < σ * .
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Proposition 5. RS is advantageous at every state x such that γ = 0, λ < 0, and σ > σ * .
The rate of growth λ is higher if A is larger or ρ is lower. The same mistakes in the tax policy may give rise to RS in one country and do not have this consequence in another one if consumers of the first country are more impatient and its technology is less productive.
Let us assume now that the scale of RS activity γ is endogenous and is changing in accordance to the following differential equation
where f is an increasing function, f(0) = 0. This relation entails that γ increases if RS is locally advantageous and decreases if RS is locally harmful. In our model, 4 One can check that α is the optimal tax rate in the corresponding welfare optimization problem (Barro,1990 ). 
Fig.2
Now RS turns out to be locally advantageous again, and the intrinsic forces have to shift γ to an arbitrary small neighborhood of its maximum value 1. This means that a smaller proportion of the tax collected is used as a source of public service.
Therefore investment into production turns out to be inefficient, and the agents should prefer to intensify RS activity, i.e. to increase γ. The more intensive is RS, the less efficient is production, and the stronger incentives exist to intensify RS.
This kind of positive feedback is a standard cause of so-called institutional traps (Polterovich, 1999) . The propositions above lead to a hypothesis that negative correlation between RS and growth, observed in a number of empirical papers, is not necessarily a result of negative influence of the RS activity on the economic development. It may be, at least partially, caused by factors that influence both RS and the economic growth. Since -u″( c ) / u′ (c ) = θ / c , one has the relation (9)
The equilibrium real rate of return r is constant (see (14)), hence the equilibrium consumption growth rate λ is constant as well.
The equality (10) follows from the equilibrium condition (16) and the first order optimality condition (8) . This equation entails that s/a is a constant on the equilibrium trajectories. Then y/a is also a constant in view of (3), (13), and (8).
Denote µ = r + y/a. Now the equation (2) . In view of (10) , λ = const. Then the overall utility function
where ρ > λ(1 -θ). In view of (9),
Differentiating (A3) and (A2) with respect to γ, one has
Formula (11) and (A2) entail
In view of (10) 
Therefore and due to (A6), (A7), and (A5) one has
Let us denote
Then, multiplying (A4) by c 0
Let us substitute (A8) and (A9) into (A11).
Note that
in view of (14) . Therefore
Now, we have from (A12), (A16), (A17)
Since ρ/r -1 = ωθ -θ, we have the following relation
which coincides with (17) .
It follows from (A14) and (A15) that q γ /(1 -θ) = -r γ θ > 0. Therefore Proposition A2 is a consequence of the equality (A10).
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3.
The function Γ(γ, σ, α, θ, ω), defined by (17) , is increasing with respect to σ, θ, and ω and decreasing with respect to γ and α. The function
defined by (18) , increasing with respect to ρ, and decreasing with respect to γ and A. Therefore Γ(x) decreases with respect to A and increases with respect to ρ. This proves the first statement of Proposition 3.
Evidently, r(σ = 1) = 0, ω(σ =1) = ∞, and Γ( σ = 1) = ∞. This entails Proposition 2.
To prove the second statement of Proposition 3, let γ 0 , A 0 , ρ 0 , σ 0 , α 0 , θ 0 be fixed. Then Γ is an increasing function of ω, and Γ(0) < 0, Γ(∞) > 0. Therefore there exists ω * such that Γ(ω * ) = 0. The function ω(A, ρ), defined by (18) , is increasing with respect to ρ and decreasing with respect to A. It maps each of the intervals of feasible values of A and ρ into (0,∞). Therefore one can find A * and ρ * such that ω(A * , ρ 0 ) = ω * , ω(A 0 , ρ * ) = ω * . Proposition 3 is proved.
Proof of Propositions 4 and 5.
Let α and θ be fixed, and
The inequality λ = r -ρ > 0 is equivalent to the inequality ω = (ρ/r + θ -1) /θ < 1.
If ω < 1 then
If λ < 0 then ω > 1, and, under γ =0, we have: Γ> V(σ). The function V(σ) is increasing with respect to σ and has σ* = (αθ + α 
II.1. Preliminary remarks
In the model studied above we assumed that producers are homogenous, the production functions have very simple and special form, and the proportion of government revenue assigned for RS does not depend on rent seekers' efforts. In the second part of the paper we consider a static production model where, however, all these restrictions are removed.
Below an equilibrium model is developed where corruption behavior is described in revealed form and the technology of counter-productive reallocation is derived from behavioral assumptions. The model includes an arbitrary number of producers and a representative bureaucrat-bribe-taker. Production functions depend on two inputs that are a homogeneous resource (money) and a public good. The bureaucrat collects a part of GDP as tax payments and has to transform it into the public good. But he/ she prefers to receive bribes giving some part of the government revenue as subsidies to producers. The bribe-taker decisions are generated by maximization of a goal function that brings into confrontation money utility and disutility of punishment. The corruption equilibrium is compared with an optimal corruption-free regime. I demonstrate that non-optimal tax policy can result in support of a corruption regime by some or even by all producers. It is proved that if the tax rate is not bigger than optimal one and marginal cost elasticity of production functions is not bigger than 1 6 then the corruption regime is Pareto inferior independently on the scale of corruption and
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A version of this Part circulated as a manuscript from 1998, and some results were described in Polterovich (1998). 6 This condition was received by Polishchuk and Savvateev (1997) for a model with homogeneous producers and without taxes and public goods. 
II. 2. Corruption equilibrium
I consider a set of producers indexed by i each of them has initial amount of money M i . Prices of the production input and outputs are supposed to be fixed and do not figure in the model. The production i is described by a production function F i (m i , g) that depends on the amount m i of money invested and the quantity g of a public good which is free of charge. A representative bureaucrat collects taxes by tax rate σ and has to transform the collected money into public good. But he/she prefers to allocate a part of this money as direct subsidies to 21 producers for bribes 7 . The bribe system is supposed to work as a competitive market so that a bribe price q of the ruble of subsidies is set up to equilibrate the supply and demand for subsidies. Every producer allocates his/her money between production and bribes solving the following maximization problem:
max (1-σ)F i (m i , g) + z i w. r. to (m i , z i ) (2.1)
where z i is the subsidy received. This is a very stylized description. Usually total subsidy level and distribution of subsidies are results of interactions among many bureaucrats and lobbing groups. 8 Two simplest form of the utility function are u (m b ) -π(γ) or u (m b ) / π(γ) where u is utility of money and π is a penalty function. Our assumption that disutility of punishment depends not on absolute value of bribes but on the relative scale of bribe activity seems to be reasonable though it needs to be tested.
In the sequel, the set of producers is supposed either to be finite or to be equal to a segment. In the later case, the symbol Σ will denote integration over the segment.
Let us study the model. Below we use the following assumptions. 
A2
. U is defined for all m b ≥ 0 and γ ∈ [ 0,1) , smooth, strictly concave, its partial derivatives satisfy the conditions
The condition A2a means that the disutility of punishment increases much faster than utility of money, when the bureaucrat devoted almost all money at his/her disposal to the corruption activity. In accordance to A2b a stronger punishment diminishes marginal utility of money. where µ^(.) is the vector whose components are m^i (a function of i) and
The first order condition for (2.13), (2.14) is written as Proof. We need to prove that the function ψ(x) = Γ(x)/ x is decreasing. From (2.11)
we have for x = m^b > 0, γ^ = Γ(m^b)
This can be considered as an identity which defines ψ. Differentiation entails the following equality U 11 ′ +U 12 ′ (ψ +xψ′) + U 2 ′ψ′ + U 21 ′ψ + U 22 ′ (ψ +xψ′) ψ = 0.
All second derivatives are negative, by concavity and by A2b. Since U 2 ′ <0 one has to conclude that ψ′ <0. Hence B is concave.
The following statement substantially simplifies the exploration of our equilibrium model . is an equilibrium if and only if (m^ i , i∈ I ) is a solution of (2.17)-(2.19) and the following equality holds
Theorem 1 (Equivalence Theorem
We omit the proof for it follows straightforwardly from a comparison of the first order optimality conditions for the optimization problem and the equilibrium conditions including (2.20).
Note that an equilibrium value g^ is a parameter of the maximized function (2.17). A remarkable case arises, if the following assumption is valid,
A3. F i (m i , g) = f i (m i ) ϕ(g).
Instead of ϕ(g) one can take α i ϕ(g) and then redefine f i . Assumption A3, means that the elasticities of the production functions with respect to public good are equal and independent of money expenditures.
The following statement is a straightforward consequence of both A3 and the Equivalence Theorem. Theorem 2 shows that the equilibrium money distribution can be found independently on the public good. After that all other equilibrium parameters can be calculated straightforwardly 9 .
Existence of a corruption equilibrium is also a consequence of Equivalence Theorem. 
Proof. Let S(g^) =(S i (g^)) be the solution of the problem (2.17)-(2.19) Denote G (g^) = g^ -(1-Γ(M -Σ S i (g^)))σ ΣF i ( S i (g^), g^).
Evidently G(g^)>0 if g^ is large enough, and G(g^) <0 if g^ is small. By Theorem 1, the proof is complete.
II.3. Corruption equilibrium with markets
In this Section we introduce both credit and borrowing into the corruption Proposition 3. Assume A1-A3 obtain and assume j be strictly concave, then every producer prefers a CEM to a corruption equilibrium with the same inital endowments M i , i.e.
for all i (see (2.13) , (2.15)).
To prove the proposition, let us consider (2.15) and let us write (3.6) in an equivalent form
where λ is defined by (3. 
The main goal of this paper is to analyze determinants of corruption in framework of the model described. First of all we define corruption-free equilibrium and ask if it is Pareto-superior to corruption regimes.
II. 4. Corruption-free equilibrium: the problem of social stability
Let us define a concept of equilibrium without corruption but with markets To be short we will say sometimes that a producer " votes against corruption" if the CFE-value of her/his welfare function is not inferior to the CEM-value, respectively that she/he "supports corruption" in the opposite case.
Our purpose is to describe the conditions under which a corruption -free regime is Pareto-superior to a corruption equilibria. In this case the CFE can be considered socially stable. If this condition prevails then there is a hope that a corrupted economy might transform into a corruption-free one.
Let us consider cost function c(y) which is the inverse of the production function y = f(m). Denote by e i the elasticity of the marginal cost function corresponding to f i . One can check that
In what follows, we asume that
The following theorem is the main result of the Part 2.
Theorem 4. Assume A1-A3 be valid, elasticities e i of marginal cost functions e i ≤ 1, and
where γ is a CEM value of the bribe proportion. Then all agents prefer the CFE to the CEM and hence, to the corruption equilibrium with the same initial amounts of money M i .
We prove this statement in Section 6 after considering of a special "limit case". The function K(γ,α) increases with respect to γ and reaches its infimum α at γ = 0. Thus criterion (4.3) can be broken even under maximal punishment, if
However one should note that the Government problem can be formulated as the maximization of the following social welfare function with respect to σ. The solution of the latter is equal to σ = α. Therefore Theorem 4 entails the following important statement.
Theorem 5. Let A1-A3 and (4.2) be valid, e i ≤ 1, and tax rate σ is not larger than its optimal value σ = α. Then the condition (4.3) holds, and all agents vote against corruption.
Thus under assumption e i ≤ 1 the agent may support corruption only if the tax rate is above its optimal level i.e. if the state pretends to be more influential than it is entailed by existing technology of public service production . In the last case moderate corruption (not very large γ ) can be preferable for some or even for all producers. To understand the situation let us take a close to zero. Then increase of public service g above 1 gives a small production effect, so that tax extraction turns out to be a loss for the economy. Therefore the producers prefer to get back a part of the lost money through corruption. Only if the corruption is large enough to 30 fulfill (4.3) then its negative effect outweighs and the producers vote against corruption.
The following example illuminates the situation. One can note that e i = 1 in this example which is clearly not crucial.
Condition (4.3) holds also if the tax rate is larger than its optimal level, but corruption level is large enough so that the corruption activity turns out to be inferior.
There is a common belief that law enforcement is needed to enhance efficiency and to diminish transaction costs. Example 1 and Theorem 4 show that it is not always true (if one says just about a production criterion and does not take into account a moral damage from corruption.) 31 One can show that the marginal cost elasticity (MCE) condition of Theorem 4 is also substantial (see Savvateev (1997) , Polishchuk and Savvateev (1997) and Example 2 of the next section). If MCE condition is not fulfilled then strong law enforcement can be necessary to avoid corruption.
The MCE condition needs to be discussed in greater details. First of all, note that the "corruption technology " is linear in our model : the allocation of subsidies among producers is proportional to the amount of bribe money paid. The MCE is equal to zero if a production function is linear. One may assume that a relation between MCE's of the production and corruption technologies does matter. This observation leads to the following idea: to fight corruption one needs not just to increase punishment strength (decreasing g) but to change the competitive (linear) corruption mechanism. We do not develop this idea here. To prove Theorem 4, we consider first the following "limit case", which has an interest of its own. where r = 1/q~, The left hand side of (4.3) is indefinite under γ=1, α=0. The considerations below will show that it has to be taken as 1 for this case. (One can imagine that 1-γ approaches zero much faster than α, for example γ = 1 -exp(-1/α 2 )).
33
To prove Theorem 4 we calculate V iσ ′ = dV i /dσ. It turns out that the derivative V iσ ′ is negative if e i ≤ 1 for all i. Therefore V i reaches its maximum at σ = 0, that proves the statement.
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In fact we will be able to get a little bit stronger result: it is enough that e i ≤ 1/(1-σ) for V iσ ′ to be negative. Under this condition a small decrease of the appropriated proportion σ is Pareto-improving. 6) where If e i = -
Using (5.2) one has
If M i -m i ≥ 0 then V iσ ′ < 0 , and the statement is proved.
There is a way to prove the statement through simpler calculations. But our method permits us to make other useful conclusions. The case M i -m i < 0 does not require the condition e i ≤ 1/(1-σ). We have
in view of (5.4) -(5.7).
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Therefore
if M i -m i < 0. Let us use (5.9) and concavity of the production function f.
We have
It completes the proof of Theorem 4 for the limit case.
Now it is simple to check that the following statements are valid. Corruption can root in both types of distortions: wrong initial resource allocation or wrong tax policy. Proposition 5 shows that the special conditions for production functions can compensate both types of distortions in the "limit case". 13 Indeed r σ ′ < 0 due to (5.6),(5.7). Therefore Σm iσ ′ < 0. But (5.4) entails that all m iσ have the same sign. 14 One has to take into account that the optimal tax level is equal to zero when public service is absent. The elasticity of marginal costs is bigger than 1 in this example. Therefore the economy is sensible to the policy mistakes. The corruption advantage is rooted in the tax policy imperfection.
II. 6. Proof of Theorem 4 and some comparative statics
Proof . Due to Proposition 3 CEM is Pareto superior to every CE, therefore one has to compare CFE and CEM. For notation convenience in this proof we will omit symbol ~ in notation of CEM parameters. We will prove that .
Therefore and due to homogeneity of ϕ one has using (4.3)
Let λ be given by (6.3) and let r = Y/H. (6.9) , γ is small enough and σ is optimal, σ = α then all producers prefer corruption -free equilibrium.
To study the influence of the tax rate σ let us assume that Γ(x) is an increasing function. Since Γ(x)/x is decreasing and A3 is valid one can derive from The notion of corruption equilibrium was defined above for a special kind of corruption activity connected with government spending for industrial public service and with bribe competition for subsidies. For this setting, we demonstrate that support of corruption is connected not only with imperfections of initial resource allocation, but also with non-optimal tax policies, and that an efficient policy itself does not guarantee social stability of corruption-free equilibria. The conditions were described that entail Pareto-superiority of corruption-free regimes.
These results seem to be important for the understanding of a two-side connection between rent seeking and economic growth. On the one hand rent seeking hampers economic growth. On the other hand quantitative growth with slow change in technologies can entail increase of marginal cost elasticity under 40 large inputs in view of exhaustion of extensive growth factors. Technical progress diminishes this elasticity and creates incentives to dismantle counter-productive regimes. It leads to a testable hypothesis that corruption and RS have to be intensive not only in young low efficient economies, but also in old stagnating systems.
The comparative statics of corruption equilibria was investigated here under very restrictive assumptions. More efforts should be done to understand the behavior of the economic system when conditions of Theorem 4 are not fulfilled and corruption can be supported by some producers. An important task is also the incorporation of a more general RS mechanism, studied in Part II, in a growth model.
